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Abstract
While research tends to explore questions of power and leadership at the national level, populism in Europe hasmoved be-
yond national borders, with an increasing number of transnational movements and organizations. This article investigates
theDemocracy in EuropeMovement 2025 (DiEM25) and its leadership’smain speeches. Informed by both discourse theory
and Michel Foucault’s work on parrhesia (veridiction), the analysis draws on readings of transnational Euroalternativism
and populism, pointing out the conflicting logic of bringing them together at the transnational level. Our findings thus
stress the increasing politicization of European integration as an opportunity to mobilize transnational activities, which
are based on the populist ‘people vs. the elites’ dichotomy and against Brussels’ unaccountable elites (see FitzGibbon &
Guerra, 2019), while indicating the limits of leadership in a populist transnational movement (de Cleen, Moffitt, Panayotu,
& Stavrakakis, 2019; Marzolini & Souvlis, 2016).
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1. Introduction
The Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25) of-
ficially took off at the Volksbühne (the ‘People’s Theatre’)
in Rosa Luxembourg Platz, in Berlin, on Tuesday 9th
February 2016. Since then, DiEM25 has developed as a
pan-European political movement whose raison d’être
is the democratization of the European Union (EU;
Moffitt, 2017). The movement’s founding fathers, for-
merGreek financeminister Yanis Varoufakis and Croatian
philosopher Srećko Horvat have presented European cit-
izens with two simple choices regarding the EU’s fu-
ture. The institutions, policies and procedures of the
EU will either become more democratic or the Union
will disintegrate (DiEM25, n.d.-a). In the meantime, the
EU’s multiple crises have meant that DiEM25 now res-
onates with citizens across Europe who share disap-
pointment and distrust in how the EU works (Panayotu,
2017). Its critical stances towards the EU—here defined
as Euroalternative, as explained below—translated into
electoral gains in the recent Greek national elections,
where the movement’s electoral wing, under the lead-
ership of Varoufakis, gained 3.44% of the national vote
and nine seats in the country’s parliament (“Final results
of Greek national elections,” 2019).
The success of DiEM25 should be seen within the
context of increasing populism in Southern Europe.
Considering the EU technocrats and bureaucrats in
Brussels to be suppressors of the citizens’ voice in
European governance (DiEM25, n.d.-b), the movement
has embraced the populist dichotomist logic of people
vs. the elites (Laclau, 2005a; Mudde, 2004; Stavrakakis,
2017). DiEM25’s criticism of the EU is its primary politi-
cal strategy, bringing together heterogeneous public de-
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mands, all under the people’s concept (see also de Cleen,
Glynos, & Mondon, 2018). As argued elsewhere, the
combination of a critical narrative towards the EU and
a populist logic is not a new phenomenon in Southern
Europe. It can be traced back to the national political suc-
cesses of Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece (Fanoulis
&Guerra, 2017; Kioupkiolis & Katsambekis, 2018). Yet, lit-
tle research has been published regarding the combina-
tion of transnational opposition to European integration,
termed Euroalternativism (FitzGibbon & Guerra, 2019),
and populism.
In order to fill this gap, our analysis examines the use
of Euroalternativist discourses by the political leadership
in transnational populism, using DiEM25 as its case study.
Expanding on recent studies (de Cleen,Moffitt, Panayotu,
& Stavrakakis, 2019; Moffitt, 2017), our research ques-
tion asks whether the movement’s leadership has suc-
ceeded in constructing a transnational people by capital-
izing on Euroalternative discourse. We also ask to what
extent DiEM25’s main political figure, Yanis Varoufakis,
has managed to bring the peoples of Europe together
by telling them the truth about the misdeeds and short-
comings of the EU. Using discourse theory and Michel
Foucault’s work on parrhesia (veridiction), our empiri-
cal investigation looks at the speeches of Varoufakis, try-
ing to capture whether the political truth, as articulated
by the movement’s leader, has resonated with the peo-
ples in the EU so much so as to construct one transna-
tional people. Our main contention is that the pursuit of
truth somehow gets stuck in the difficult passage from
national to transnational populism. In terms of discourse
theory, signifiers such as ‘change the EU’ or ‘for a more
democratic Europe’ are used tendentially in Varoufakis’
Euroalternativist discourse as unspoken truths. They can
bring together the notion of the people, but also establish
an internal frontier in Europe’s social space between an
‘us, the pan-European people’ versus ‘them, the Brussels’
elites.’ Thus, the focus of our study lies on how the move-
ment’s leader makes use of a Euroalternativist truth in or-
der to establish a transnational European people.
The analysis will proceed as follows. Section 2
presents our theoretical framework, i.e., Laclau’s basic
concepts in his theory of populism and the Foucauldian
notion of parrhesia. Section 3 revisits the emergence of
DiEM25 by rereading its manifesto, with topical empha-
sis on its references to populism and Euroalternativism—
having introduced the latter as a contemporary form of
pro-systemic opposition towards the EU. Section 4 con-
sists of a brief note justifying ourmethodological choices.
In the section that follows, we present a discourse analy-
sis of key speeches of Yanis Varoufakis, as the leader of
DiEM25. Having elaborated on how the question of lead-
ership affects the transnational expansion of DiEM25,
the conclusion of this study addresses the weakness of
shifting to a homogeneous people for a transnational
populist movement andwe underline the political poten-
tial of a progressive Euroalternativist movement speak-
ing truth to power via its leader(ship).
2. Laclau’s Populism and Foucault’s Parrhesia
Laclau (2005a) developed an account of populism cen-
tred on key concepts of his discourse theory, namely
logics of difference and equivalence, internal frontier
and antagonism, and empty signifiers. First of all, Laclau
presents populism as a distinct “political logic” (Laclau,
2005a, p. 117) and a “logic of articulation” (Laclau, 2005b,
p. 33) that brings together heterogeneous public de-
mands as they emerge in society. This process is both so-
cial and relational. As Laclau (2005a, p. 73) writes, “‘the
people’ is not something of the nature of an ideological
expression, but a real relation between social agents.’’
But how is it possible that highly diverse socio-
political demands, coming from a plethora of societal
actors with highly differentiated political identities can
be jointly articulated? Two processes appear to happen
in parallel, one based on a logic of difference and one
on a logic of equivalence. On the one hand, public de-
mands have to maintain their uniqueness in the societal
realm so as satisfy the distinct groups or actors articu-
lating them. On the other hand, their plurality gets ac-
knowledged in a democratic society according to a logic
of equivalence, that means they are understood to be of
equal democratic importance (Laclau, 2005b).
In lines with populist reasoning, there needs to be
some sort of pairing of these heterogeneous demands,
whilst maintaining their ‘particularity’ to use Laclau’s
own words. This can occur by tying them up in a chain of
equivalence. The chain of equivalence downplays the ele-
ment of heterogeneity and socially constructs an analogy
between the public demands, which is then able to keep
them together. There is an inherent tension in this pro-
cedure, also acknowledged by Laclau (2005a, p. 122) “so
the equivalential chain necessarily plays a double role:
it makes the emergence of the particularism of the de-
mands possible but, at the same time, it subordinates
them to itself as a necessary surface of inscription.”
Yet, for the equivalential chain to be able to subordi-
nate the public demands to itself, it needs to recalibrate
them around features they share even in their distinctive
uniqueness. Simply put, there needs to be a kind of ‘glue’
that can stick the public demands together. For Laclau,
this is done by means of introducing an internal frontier
in the society, splitting the social space into two camps.
The ‘glue’ that brings together the heterogeneous pub-
lic demands is their common political aversion towards
an antagonistic other, a common political adversary that
does not allow for these demands to be satisfied (Laclau,
2005a, p. 131).
This ‘glue’ is the notion of the people for Laclau.
The people is a signifier which aligns the heterogeneous
public demands and does so by recognizing their com-
mon enemy that exists in society, yet is outside of the
people’s equivalential chain. The notion of the people
thus ‘hegemonizes’ the meaning of the heterogeneous
public demands by introducing them all under its signi-
fier (Laclau, 2005a, pp. 132–133). At the same time, the
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people’s own signifier is ‘emptied’ during this process
(Laclau, 2005b).
The above abstract discussion has been summarized
by post-Laclauian scholars in what is called the minimal
definition of populism. As Stavrakakis and Katsambekis
(2014, p. 123) note, a movement or party can be con-
sidered populist if it establishes the notion of the peo-
ple, and does so based on an antagonistic logic of a “we,
the people” versus an out-group that shares the same so-
cial space with the people yet is always outside of their
group. What is striking in both Laclau and his followers’
theorization of populism is the marginal attention to the
role of political agency in populism and especially in re-
lation to the role of the populist leader. Laclau (2005a, p.
99) has emphasized that his analytical schematization of
populism is ‘structural’ and his elaboration of the pop-
ulist leader follows the same pattern. However, an in-
vestigation of the populist leader necessitates looking
more closely at questions of political agency. In this anal-
ysis, we consider that Foucault’s notion of parrhesia, as
it emerges in the French philosopher’s governmentality
approach, can help with such a task.
What we particularly focus on here is the linkages of
parrhesia to populismon the one hand and leadership on
the other. Translated into ‘veridiction’ or ‘truth-telling’—
‘franc-parler’ in the original French text—Foucault (2010,
p. 52) argues that parrhesia is not simply the ontology
of truth, but refers instead to the practice of telling the
truth in a specific spatio-temporal context, where the
parrhesiast—the agent standing up to tell the truth—is
aware of the political risks and consequences that their
outspokenness entails (Foucault, 2010, p. 56).
Parrhesia’s basic features unravel in this definition. It
is not just a performed act of truth or simply a speech act.
As Luxon (2008, p. 379) highlights, “Foucault remainsmost
interested in parrhesia as a concrete set of practices that
condition the parameters of individual self-development.”
This set of practices is truthful not only because of being
true but most importantly because the parrhesiastic sub-
ject freely and courageously chooses to speak the truth
despite any unfavourable conditions or consequences for
them due to the power nexus (Foucault, 2010, p. 66). As
Foucault (2010, p. 66) attests, “parrēsia is the ethics of
truth-telling as an action which is risky and free.’’
Foucault distinguishes between good and bad par-
rhesia, a distinction that he draws both politically and
normatively. It is sometimes difficult to identify a clear-
cut definition of good parrhesia in his texts; the philoso-
pher moulds our perception of it abductively, by giving
examples of bad parrhesia such as flattery and dema-
goguery. Good parrhesiasts—philosophers like Socrates,
or politicians like ancient Athens’ Pericles—stand out
in a demos of equals with an equal right to talk freely
(isegoria), taking the floor and speaking the truth at their
own risk. Hence, good parrhesia stands at a crossroads of
ethics, knowledge, and power (Dyrberg, 2014).
This truthful set of practices results in various politi-
cal relations which become meaningful in the context of
a democratic polity. Firstly, there is the relationship of
the parrhesiast to their own self, i.e., their commitment
to be truthful and hence step beyond the existing power
status quo in order to tell the truth. Secondly, there is the
relationship that develops between the parrhesiast and
the rest of the demos, what Foucault (2010) calls ascen-
dancy and it clearly links to the question of political lead-
ership in democracies. The parrhesiast emerges from the
rest of the citizenswith the ethical task of telling the truth
to those who govern, hence acquiring a leadership po-
sition among their fellow citizens. And thirdly, there is
the relationship between the parrhesiast and the politi-
cal system itself, to which the parrhesiast addresses the
truth. These three different relations constitute a formof
pact, the “parrhesiastic pact,” which for Foucault (2010,
pp. 65–66, 163) is essential for the governing of oneself
and of others in democratic politics.
Two aspects of the parrhesiastic pact are crucial for
the ensuing investigation. The first is the linkage with
the question of leadership. Parrhesia introduces a con-
stitutive relationship between truth and the political
agency of the leader. It bestows power and an ethical
dimension upon this agency, which in turn become inter-
connected. By telling the truth in a free and unbinding
manner, the parrhesiast’s subject position in the power
nexus changes, allowing them to govern others because
of their being so truthful (to themselves) that they can
first of all govern, and by doing so, form their own self
(Foucault, 2011).What is more, the rising of the parrhesi-
astic leader is accompanied by an ontological bond to the
truthwith a profound ethical dimension. Thismeans that
their power to govern results from their normative pact
to tell the truth both to the subjects as well as the rulers.
How does parrhesiastic leadership then connect
with populism? Laclau’s vision of the populist leader as
“primus inter pares” (as cited in Mazzolini & Borriello,
2018, p. 242) coincides with Foucault’s understanding of
the parrhesiast. In populism’s radical democratic politics,
the parrhesiastic leader feels ethically compelled to tell
the truth by becoming the people’s voice. The populist
leader addresses the truth in two consequential steps.
First of all, the leader stands out from the rest of the
citizens and raises awareness of the injustice, exploita-
tion, and oppression experienced by unprivileged groups
within a society. The leader then succeeds in bringing
those heterogeneous public demands together in a chain
of equivalence, under the common signifier of the peo-
ple. At the same time, the parrhesiastic leader cements
the notion of the people by accentuating the antagonis-
tic relationship between this nascent people and its op-
pressors, i.e., the Establishment and economic and polit-
ical elites (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014).
3. DiEM25 as a Euroalternative Transnational
Movement
In 2017, the year after the first steps of DiEM25
into European politics, John FitzGibbon, Benjamin
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Leruth, and Nick Startin (2017) published an edited
volume on transnational Euroscepticism. The recent
Eurozone crisis had impacted the increasing levels of
dissatisfaction towards the EU, while the academic
literature still seemed to focus on national, party-
based Euroscepticism (Taggart, 1998; for hard and soft
Euroscepticism, see Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2002). With
time, opposition has become more widespread and
critical voices have additionally emerged in civil soci-
ety (FitzGibbon, 2013). In order to explain the current
protests, the volumemodelled this newmanifestation of
pan-European opposition to the EU (Usherwood, 2017),
where exogenous crises and events such as treaty re-
forms or the economic crisis, are significant factors af-
fecting Euroalternativist mobilization beyond national
borders. These crises may well explain the emergence
of DiEM25 as a Euroalternative transnational movement
and can be traced in its Manifesto, which states:
The Eurozone economies are being marched off the
cliff of competitive austerity, resulting in permanent
recession in the weaker countries and low investment
in the core countries; EU member-states outside the
Eurozone are alienated, seeking inspiration and part-
ners in suspect quarters; unprecedented inequality,
declining hope and misanthropy flourish throughout
Europe. (DiEM25, n.d.-f)
Previous research has already argued that the tensions
arising from European integration and the social costs
of the EU’s multiple crises have successfully mobilized
discontent and contestation across different European
countries (Fanoulis & Guerra, 2017). At the domestic
level, the anti-EU narrative has given voice to the citi-
zens’ dissatisfaction with national and EU elites, follow-
ing a populist antagonistic logic of ‘us’ versus ‘them.’
DiEM25’s antagonistic logic moves beyond national bor-
ders. It mainly revolves around the EU elites, such as
the appointed technocrats of the European Central Bank,
to defend democracy in countries that demonize the
left of centre or do not pay real attention to the peo-
ple against “corporate power” across Europe (DiEM25,
n.d.-f). Moreover, in DiEM25 leader Yanis Varoufakis’
view, there is no democracy in the EU. The EU thus needs
to be reformed, otherwise it will implode and “we, the
peoples of Europe, have a duty to regain control over
our Europe from unaccountable ‘technocrats,’ complicit
politicians and shadowy institutions” (DiEM25, n.d.-f).
Most importantly, DiEM25, shows a pro-systemic op-
position towards the EU (FitzGibbon & Guerra, 2019),
and transnationally mobilizes citizens by asking for
greater accountability and transparency. Such a critical
view of European integration is defined as (progressive)
Euroalternativism (FitzGibbon & Guerra, 2019). Policies,
not the polity, are at stake here. Euroalternativism, as
pro-systemic contestation, emerged after the EU’s eco-
nomic and financial crisis. Due to the central reference
to economic and social costs, Euroalternativism can be
traced in DiEM25’s manifesto that seeks “to subject the
EU’s bureaucracy to the will of sovereign European peo-
ples; to dismantle the habitual domination of corporate
power over the will of citizens, and to re-politicize the
rules that govern our single market and common cur-
rency” (DiEM25, n.d.-f). Such critical voices are similar to
the first ‘Euro-critical’ social movements and protests ex-
amined during the anti-austerity protests of 2011 (della
Porta, Kouki, & Fernández, 2017), signalling a loss of trust
in both national and EU institutions. These movements
did not call for a return to the nation-state, but a process
of Europeanization from below. Similarly, DiEM25’s call is
to all EU citizens, the ‘democrats’ (in bold in the original
below), and is not fully hostile to the EU. As mentioned
on the movement’s web-page, “committed democrats
must resolve to act across Europe” (DiEM25, n.d.-f) as
well as for Europe.
It is worth noting that DiEM25’s progressive
Euroalternativism is distinct from the radical right
(and nationalist) approaches of sovereigntist alt-
Euroalternativists, who “believe European cooperation
can only work through the member states—even if the
nature of the policy means that this must take place
at the European level” (FitzGibbon & Guerra, 2019).
DiEM25 seeks to embrace all democrats across and be-
yond Europe. References, meetings and direct partici-
pation thus move beyond European borders, with af-
filiations to Noam Chomsky, Naomi Klein, and Bernie
Sanders, with local DiEM25 Spontaneous Collectives
(DSCs) and groups of volunteers also based in Australia
and the United States (DiEM25, n.d.-g). As poignantly
highlighted byMoffitt (2017), it is in the ambiguity of the
passage from ‘the people’ to ‘the peoples’ that the con-
struction of a transnational populist movement seems
unsurmountable, as demands at the transnational level
mainly emerge through national demands, with national
characteristics. Yet, the analysis that follows stresses an
emerging transnational progressive Euroalternativism
intrinsic in DiEM25’s and Varoufakis’ populist discourse.
4. A Note on Methodology
Case study research is an effectivemethodology to exam-
ine and understand complex real-world issues. Central
to this approach is the underpinning ontological and
epistemological contribution gained through inductive
analysis, which is the approach adopted here. Discourse
theory, and Michel Foucault’s work on ‘parrhesia’ will
help us bring together the different dimensions of the
case study and investigate the narrative and leader-
ship discourse in DiEM25. Our empirical investigation fo-
cuses on 2019, being the most recent, and the year in
which both the European Parliament (EP) elections and
Greek general elections were held, alongside the rising
salience of the Euroalternativist voice vis-à-vis the EU.
The speeches were retrieved from the movement’s offi-
cial web-page (diem25.org) and the personal web-page
of Yanis Varoufakis (yanisvaroufakis.eu). Concerning the
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latter, we initially collected all of Varoufakis’ interviews
from the year 2019 via his personal web-page. To reduce
the amount of data, selection was limited to only those
whose thematology was clearly centered on EU politics
and European integration.
The analysis concentrates on the two most signif-
icant expressions of DiEM25’s discourse, its progres-
sive Euroalternativism and its populist dimension, as
they together aim to mobilize, from the bottom-up, the
true democrats of Europe. We first establish that Yanis
Varoufakis emerged as the political leader of DiEM25
due to his being empowered by an ethical urge to re-
veal the truth about the EU to its peoples. In Foucauldian
terms, we hence justify Varoufakis’ ascendancy as the
parrhesiastic subject within DiEM25, speaking the truth
about the EU to fellowmembers of themovement, to the
whole body of European citizens, as well as to the politi-
cal actors governing the EU (Varoufakis, 2017). We then
evaluate whether his Euroalternativist attempt to reveal
the problems of European integration has succeeded in
constructing a transnational people.
5. Rereading the Discourse of DiEM25’s Political
Leadership
Thanks to his office as the Greek minister of finance dur-
ing periods of acute contestation regarding EU decisions
by both the national government and the Greek people,
Varoufakis had the chance to articulate what he consid-
ered to be the truth about the working of the EU insti-
tutions. In the midst of a highly mediatized financial cri-
sis, Varoufakis’ dissident conduct in the Council of the EU
gave voice to concerns about the institutional power of
appointed, unelected, technocratic actors in the EU in-
stitutions. Varoufakis criticized the EU Commission for
its bureaucratic handling of EU policies and governance,
arguing that “raw, brutish power [had] taken the place
of the democratic process” (BruegelEvents, n.d.). He
pointed to the bureaucratic narrowmindedness of the EU
institutions concerning innovative solutions to the EU’s
contemporary challenges. For example, on his innovative
idea of an EU antipoverty fund sponsored by European
Central Bank (ECB) resources, Varoufakis claimed that
this option “offended those in EU that austerity has
given them enormous power,” implying the Troika mech-
anism (StartupTV, 2019). Varoufakis’ criticism against the
modus operandi of EU institutions culminated with the
publication of his autobiographical best-seller, Adults in
the Room: My Battle with Europe’s Deep Establishment
(Varoufakis, 2017), focusing on his time as Greece’s fi-
nance minister.
Either due to having been on the media’s spotlight
or due to his academic reputation as a professor of eco-
nomics, Varoufakis undoubtedly ascended in the polit-
ical realm as a defiant voice speaking the truth about
the shortcomings of European integration both coura-
geously and freely, whilst presenting an alternative view
of the EU. His leadership style can be explained through
political charisma (Pappas, 2016). In the restlessness of
formal institutions, the transnational movement has al-
lowed Varoufakis “to defy prevailing worldviews, forg-
ing instead new collective entities based on discourses
of justification against the established” (Pappas, 2016,
p. 379), and by providing a “radical founding of a novel
structure of legitimacy” (Pappas, 2016, p. 379). At times
of short-term political commitments, Varoufakis’ fierce
voice and independence can resonate beyond ordinary
leadership (Gabriel, 2015). The public resonance of his
ideas and his political persona have allowed him to be-
come the central voice of DiEM25 both at national—as
the leader of the Greek political party MeRA25—and
transnational levels. Furthermore, his leading subject
position within the transnational movement may well
amount to a hegemonization of DiEM25’s discourse. This
is evident by Varoufakis’ centrality in the Coordinating
Collective (CC) of the movement. It also shows in his
public appearances, whose number increased during
the campaign prior to the 2019 EP elections, as well
as in his candidacy for Member of the EP’s office in
Germany, while organizing the participation of themove-
ment’s Greek Electoral Wing (MeRA25) in the same elec-
tions. Further, it also shows in the discourse itself, whose
boldness and outspokenness reinforces Varoufakis’ posi-
tion as the de facto leader of the movement. Absolute
statements such as “the Juncker Plan was a fraud”
(BruegelEvents, n.d.), “EU as a Napoleonic project for
France” (StartupTV, 2019), “Troika caused the dissolution
of the EU” (Varoufakis, 2019a) are not only critical of
the EU, they performatively establish Varoufakis as the
only political subject among equals who reveals the truth
about the misdeeds of the EU. Having the courage to do
so, he stands out as the leader of the movement.
The consolidation of Varoufakis’ leadership role in
DiEM25 is also because he highlighted aspects of truth
about the EU and its institutions to mainstream polit-
ical subjects. He has repeatedly talked about a “very
large democratic deficit in the EU” (BBC Newsnight,
2019), condemning the secretive and non-transparent
methods of EU institutions—“Eurogroup, astounded
by the secrecy” (StartupTV, 2019)—and their ineffi-
ciency to deliver prosperity to European citizens—
“Competition Committee not having done something
about the oligopolistic practices of the big super-
markets” (Varoufakis, 2019b). Pushing a progressive
Euroalternativist agenda, Varoufakis highlights the need
for change in the EU institutions, changes that “will be
healing for the whole Europe” or “will be democratiz-
ing the EU” (Varoufakis, 2019a). A lot of different polit-
ical actors claim to speak the truth about the deficient
European project, so what makes Varoufakis’ discourse
exceptional? His discourse comes from the vantage point
of a political actor who became directly involved in the
EU policy—and decision-making procedures; hence, his
claim to the truth acquires a foundation of credibility
that may be lacking in other critical voices, and which
allows Varoufakis’ ascendancy as the parrhesiastic sub-
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ject with the courage to freely criticize the functions and
operations of the EU, no matter the political cost. In
this manner, Varoufakis’s Euroalternativist discourse re-
inforces his leading role within DiEM25.
5.1. Euroalternativism and Populism in the Context of
True Discourse
To whom does Varoufakis address the truth about the
EU’s problems? His speeches first of all target the polit-
ical subjects governing and managing Greece as an EU
member state. In his first speech in the Greek parliament
as elected party leader, Varoufakis criticized the conser-
vative government as follows: “At the same time, youwill
be awarding gifts…to our parasitic oligarchs” (Varoufakis,
2019b). Moreover, Varoufakis renounced the previous
government of left-wing SYRIZA for having consented to
Troika’s demands during theGreek financial crisis, adding
that SYRIZA was trying to hold him responsible for the
country’s austerity (Varoufakis, 2019a). Such comments
underline the antagonism between an oppressed people
and their ruling economic and political elite. Varoufakis’
populist discourse is articulated against Greece’s ruling
elites by primarily referring to their handling of the po-
sitionality of Greece within the European integration
project. Being bothMeRA25’s party leader and DiEM25’s
leader, Varoufakis manages to pull together in the same
chain of equivalence critiques of political clientelism
in Europe (“political parties and politicians are largely
funded by the oligarchy in every country not just in
Germany,” StartupTV, 2019), general demands for social
justice (“the interest of the few have a disproportion-
ate influence in political narratives,” StartupTV, 2019),
and public dissatisfaction regarding the inefficiency of EU
policies (“you know all too well that Mr. Draghi’s arsenal
is done,” Varoufakis, 2019b).
A number of observations should be highlighted.
Varoufakis’ populist logic operates simultaneously at
two interconnected levels: the Greek national, speak-
ing as the party leader of MeRA25, and the transna-
tional European level, speaking as the leading figure of
DiEM25. The two levels become interconnected via the
referent object of his discourse, which in both cases
is the Euroalternativist need to change the EU’s sedi-
mented and unpopular practices of governance. Unlike
other commentators on populism arguing that the dis-
tinction between the people and its other is moralis-
tic (see Mudde, 2004, for example), meaning a distinc-
tion between the pure people and the corrupt other,
Varoufakis’ populist discourse is based on an ethical per-
formativity of truth-claiming. This means that he estab-
lishes his populist claim on the basis that telling the
truth about the EU is the right and ethical thing to do,
no matter how hard and unpleasant this may be. In his
own words, “we will be here to reveal the working-class
dystopia, that is predestined to fail, due tomemorandum
Greece” (Varoufakis, 2019b). Of course, this presupposes
firstly an unflinching conviction on behalf of Varoufakis
that his version of facts and events is the truth and that
this is accepted as such by his audience, the people (see
also Moffitt, 2016). MeRA25’s electoral success in the
Greek elections seems to confirm the public resonance
of Varoufakis’ claim to the truth about the EU. His suc-
cess also reinforces his subject position and power sta-
tus within the domestic political party and by extension
within the transnational movement.
Interestingly, Varoufakis negates populism as a strat-
egy to gain political power:
We are here to bury populism. A populism that…the
Greek people remember, the PASOK under Simitis, a
time when the biggest debt bubble in the Eurozone
both public and private was building up, while the
Greek people were being told they belonged to the
hardcore of Eurozone. (Varoufakis, 2019b)
We witness again how Varoufakis’ discourse refers to
Greek domestic politics, but in reference to Greece’s po-
sition within EU structures and mechanisms, unravelling
the unspoken truth about Greece’s real financial situa-
tion. For a better comprehension of the statement, the
semantic and political usage of the term ‘laikismos’ (pop-
ulism) in Greek politics should be elaborated. The dom-
inant understanding of the word in the Greek language
has a negative connotation mainly due to the clientelis-
tic relationships that traditionally develop between the
Greek electorate and socioeconomic elites. It is in this
manner that Varoufakis refuses the populist label, albeit
without denying the importance of the people as the key
political actor in radical democratic politics. Moreover,
the fact that Varoufakis does not wish to adopt the pop-
ulist label as part of a long tradition in the Greek context
does not mean, nevertheless, that his political logic or
logic of articulation is not populist.
5.2. From Domestic Populism to a Transnational People
through the Gates of Euroalternativism?
The populist call of Varoufakis for real change in the
EU’s functions, a change that will serve the interests of
Europe’s peoples, goes beyond Greek borders. DiEM25’s
responsibility for the democratization of the whole EU is
a core feature in his discourse. He pledges solidarity with
the British people on Brexit (BruegelEvents, n.d.), sym-
pathizes with families in rural France that cannot pay in-
creased taxation (BruegelEvents, n.d.), and declares that
“we will be on the victim’s side, not just in Greece, but
also inGermany, in France. Because the crisis that started
here, in 2008–2010, was transmitted, through the mem-
orandum, to the entirety of the EU.” Yanis Varoufakis thus
calls upon Europeans to unite against the few, the elites
that have coalescedwith the politicians and suppress the
popular will across the EU.
The leader’s populist discourse resonates with the
movement’s political activities at a pan-European level.
Firstly, the movement has broadened its base in Europe
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to over 117,000 members (DiEM25, n.d.-c). Secondly, it
maintains a bottom-up approach and actively involves
its members in agenda-setting, including initiation of
or participation in DSCs or carrying out voluntary work
(e.g., translation, communication, etc.) for the move-
ment (DiEM25, n.d.-d). Thirdly, the institutional structure
and decision-making procedures within the movement
comply with a populist logic of merging the movement’s
leadership with its popular base. For example, the core
political mechanism of the movement, the CC, becomes
the representative voice of the movement’s member-
ship, as it articulates its stances “in response to events
that require a rapid DiEM25 response” (DiEM25, n.d.-e).
All the above indicate that DiEM25 and its leadership—
whether this is practiced individually by Varoufakis or col-
lectively by the CC and its members—have employed a
Euroalternativist populist discourse that has resonated
across Europe.
However, this does notmean that themovement has
managed to socially construct a transnational people in
the EU. This is primarily due to the populist leadership’s
limited capacity to use truth-claiming about European
integration to socially construct a transnational people.
The notion of the people needs indeed a clearly defined
constitutive other (de Cleen et al., 2019). In the case of
DiEM25 the ‘them’ are supposed to be a transnational
elite as well as an EU in need of change. In both, there
is the precocious assumption of a common agreement
across Europe regarding who the enemy of the people is.
This is erroneous for two reasons. The EU’s nature as such
is contested and fluid (what we call sui generis) and this
extends to the role of the transnational elites. Who are
these powerful, oppressing elites that stand against the
European peoples’ will and what is their exact relation-
ship with the transnational demos? Such ambivalence
blurs a clear understanding of the people’s constitutive
other. Of equal importance, EU citizens do not hold the
same understanding of the EU’s transnational elites or
of their respective roles, as evidenced by the many dif-
ferent versions of Euroscepticism and Euroalternativism
which exist (FitzGibbon & Guerra, 2019). All these point
to the fact thatwe cannot have an accurate picture of the
transnational people’s political adversary.
Moreover, the parrhesiastic role of the populist
leader needs to be highlighted at this point. Within the
context of national populism, the populist leader con-
vinces the people of the ‘us vs. them’ distinction and
eventually convinces the body politique that they can
speak on behalf of the people and hence represent the
people in democratic politics (Laclau, 2005a). This occurs
because the populist leader both articulates unheard or
silenced public demands, and speaks the truth about
the latter being under-represented. The populist leader’s
truth thus emerges as a revelation and resistance against
and despite the power relations embedded in politics. In
the context of the hegemonization of DiEM25’s discourse
by Yanis Varoufakis, in Greece, his success has proved
that his political truth can resonatewith the people there.
However, there is little empirical evidence that the other
peoples of the EU have similarly been united under a
common signifier of a transnational people wishing for
liberation from the EU Establishment, Brussels’ bureau-
cracy, and elites. Thus, DiEM25’s discourse may start
transnationally, but its political truth can still fall back to
national political outcomes and consequences. Such in-
sights do not fully agree with other scholars’ view that
DiEM25 is a case of transnational populism; our analysis
instead points towards a case of international coopera-
tion between nationally defined populist claims across
Europe (seeMoffitt, 2017, p. 410). The eventual absence
of transnational populism does not mean, however, that
we should altogether discount the political strength of
transnational progressive Euroalternativism.
6. Conclusion: Euroalternativist Leadership as a
Defender of the People against the Power of the ‘Few’
“We are inspired by a Europe of Reason, Liberty,
Tolerance and Imagination made possible by compre-
hensive Transparency, real Solidarity and authentic
Democracy” (DiEM25, n.d.-f). DiEM25 presents a distinc-
tive character in the social and political European con-
text, particularly in terms of its transnational nature
and its leadership’s discourse. Our analysis has reiter-
ated these two dimensions by investigating the most
recent key speeches of the movement’s main founder
and leader, Yanis Varoufakis. While most of the other
studies have sought to examine the movement in terms
of its transnational populism, our investigation has fo-
cused on Varoufakis’ Euroalternativist discourse as the
truth about the EU that is able to mobilize the peo-
ples of Europe, from the bottom-up, according to a pop-
ulist logic. Without being hostile to the EU, the move-
ment’s immediate priorities are full transparency in the
decision-making at the Council level, “full disclosure of
trade negotiation documents, publication of ECB min-
utes etc.) and…the urgent redeployment of existing EU
institutions in the pursuit of innovative policies that gen-
uinely address the crises of debt, banking, inadequate in-
vestment, rising poverty and migration” (DiEM25, n.d.-f).
After a short time in office as Greek finance minister,
Yanis Varoufakis became a credible voice for the progres-
sive Euroalternativist agenda by asking for change in the
EU institutions to ‘heal’ the whole of Europe.
Varoufakis’ discourse is based on an ethical performa-
tivity of truth-claiming, termed as veridiction (parrhesia).
His veridiction addresses a Euroalternativist agenda to-
wards the people, themovement, and the EU institutions.
While MeRA25’s electoral success in the Greek elections
confirms that Varoufakis’ claim to the truth about the
EU in Greece resonates with the public, this analysis
also points to different conclusions at the transnational
level. Our primary insight is that the pursuit of the truth
about the problems of EU integration provides more
opportunities for a transnational movement. The pop-
ulist dimension is still attached to domestic national poli-
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tics, whereas critical voices against the EU are becoming
morewidespread and transnational at the political,mass,
and civil society levels. This is because Euroalternativism,
or even Euroscepticism, can create alliances across bor-
ders, and can aggregate mobilization, particularly at
times of crises (see Usherwood, 2017). Progressive
Euroalternativist views converge together with similar
demands centred on the EU budget and questions of
accountability and transparency (FitzGibbon & Guerra,
2019), the same main issues that mobilize DiEM25’s
transnationalism. Hence, Euroalternativism is successful
in capitalizing on transnationalism, while populism can
be limited by national borders. The role of a parrhesiastic
leader is to articulate the truth about politics. This truth,
in the service of both Euroalternativism and populism in
the case of DiEM25 and of Yanis Varoufakis,may be a nec-
essary condition for the social construction of a transna-
tional people across Europe, yet it does not seem to be
a sufficient one.
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